Post by Pacelli on Oct 8, 2017 7:31:54 GMT -5
The following are some comments on the comments by Mr. Daly. Let the reader take note, that Mr. Daly's comments are to correct errors in the original Brussels Syllabus. His later comments or corrections are found in the blue text, differentiating it from thr original.
I would ask all who want to join this discussion to first read the "The Brussels Syllabus Commented," found in the library HERE
The following are some comments of numbers 1-14 of the Syllabus:
Mr. Daly wrote:
The error that was corrected here is the rash assumption that those who profess "material error" are to be automatically presumed to be guilty of being truly in error. So long as the Catholic believes he is believing what the Church teaches, even if he is in error, he cannot be presumed of being guilty of holding error without showing signs of malice (that he knows what the Church teaches and still refuses to believe).
5. Mr. Daly wrote:
This means as it says, that pertinacity (guilt) cannot just be presumed. Every excuse must be made in favor of the suspected person, prior to making a judgment of guilt against such a person. To do so without following this process is to sin gravely against charity.
6. Mr. Daly wrote:
There are two considerations:
(1). In order to accuse someone of heresy, it must be a denial of dogma. This means that any denial of anything short of a dogma, while it is a serious sin to deny it, cannot be called a heresy. The person in question remains a member of the Church, although such a person is guilty of censure and mortally sins if he realizes that he is holding an error less than heresy against the Faith.
(2). Even if someone is denying a dogma, as stated before, pertinacity cannot be automatically presumed. Pertinacity must be clearly evident, and all excusing factors, must be reasonably concluded to not apply.
Mr. Daly wrote:
Unless moral certainty can be formed against an individual, meaning that there are no excusing factors leading to innocence, then, and only then can we form a judgment of guilt. If there is any reason to excuse someone of guilt, we must do so. If there is a doubt, i.e. guilt is not clear, we must refrain from making any judgment. In any case of doubt, we must suspend our judgment, and wait for the legitimate authorities of the Church to act.
For this crisis, how does this principle apply? If we have no evidence against a person, other than acceptance of the antipope, that alone means that guilt cannot be presumed. If we have evidence against an individual, we must refrain from judgment, unless the evidence is so compelling that all excusing factors have reasonably been removed.
At all times, we must remember our place. The Church gives canonical warnings for a reason. They demonstrate guilt. We must be extremely cautious in making a judgment against individuals that the Church has not judged. This is not to say that we cannot make such judgments, only that extreme caution must be used.
7. Mr. Daly wrote:
Here Mr. Daly is affirming that we can make a judgment prior to the Church. This is of course presuming the principles deiscussed above.
Mr. Daly wrote:
As stated above, both considerations are necessary prior to making a judgment absent the authoritative judgment of the Church. We must be certain that we are dealing with heresy, rather than error less than heresy. We must be certain that the individual we are making a judgment about is pertinacious, i.e. guilty, that all reasonable excusing factors are not lacking.
Mr. Daly wrote:
Here, Mr. Daly gives a warning, that we must not deem certain what is in fact doubtful. We cannot just on flimsy evidence just presume pertinacity. We must try to excuse the person under suspicion. Secondly, we must be certain that we are dealing with real heresy rather than presumed heresy. Many doctrines are such that they carry a note less than heresy.
We must refrain from accusing those of heresy, those who are guilty of a lesser infraction. Such people who are guilty of a lesser infarction are indeed guilty, but are not heretics, therefore remain members of the Church unless they are judged by authority and excommunicated that by name.
Lastly, if the error is uncondemned, we must even be more cautious in making any judgment prior to the judgment of authority.
8. Mr Daly wrote, commenting on this sentence,
Here, Mr. Daly reaffirms the truth that it is not schism for rejecting Ben a true Pope if one has reasonable grounds, such as a belief that his election has been irregular.
Mr Daly added the word, "pertinacious, " explaining, "The added word "pertinacious" is absolutely necessary to make this statement accurate, and it completely alters the practical effect."
Mr. Daly is here reaffirming the necessity of pertinacity in determining schism. If pertinacity cannot be certain, absent a judgment from the Church, guilt cannot be presumed.
13. (ii). Mr. Daly wrote:
It's worth noting here that one who recognizes that the papal claimant is a pertinacious and public heretic, and continues to regard him as pope until the judgment of the Church is not holding a position contrary to the teaching of the Church. It is a minority opinion, but not a condemned opinion. The position is untenable, as Mr. Daly notes, because it practice it leads to unresolvable contradictions.
14. Mr. Daly wrote:
Mr. Daly does affirm the truth that individuals who do recognize the truth about the heretical antipopes are bound by those truths. While at the same time, we cannot assume that all Catholics are either competent to evaluate these truths, or even if they are competent, that they actually do grasp these truths.
Mr. Daly gives his opinion that "very few Catholics are learned enough to refute satisfactorily all of the arguments that have been mounted to defend Wojtyla's claim to the papacy." I agree with him , the arguments are complex, and even when Catholics grasp this truth, so many times, and I have seen this as a common problem, that they go beyond where the truth and the theology have led them. The original Brussels Syllabus is a perfect example, but this problem is widespread and still very present today.
I would ask all who want to join this discussion to first read the "The Brussels Syllabus Commented," found in the library HERE
The following are some comments of numbers 1-14 of the Syllabus:
Mr. Daly wrote:
4.
The above is correct in the sense that those who consciously reject the Catholic Magisterium, but do so in good faith, never having been Catholics, are held to be heretics in the external forum, and therefore excommunicated. But this does not apply to one who errs, however egregiously, while still disposed to believe what the Church teaches.
The above is correct in the sense that those who consciously reject the Catholic Magisterium, but do so in good faith, never having been Catholics, are held to be heretics in the external forum, and therefore excommunicated. But this does not apply to one who errs, however egregiously, while still disposed to believe what the Church teaches.
The error that was corrected here is the rash assumption that those who profess "material error" are to be automatically presumed to be guilty of being truly in error. So long as the Catholic believes he is believing what the Church teaches, even if he is in error, he cannot be presumed of being guilty of holding error without showing signs of malice (that he knows what the Church teaches and still refuses to believe).
5. Mr. Daly wrote:
This is true, but it is important not to abuse it. Pertinacity is not presumed where there is any other reasonable other explanation of the data, and it would be gravely contrary to charity to act as if it were.
This means as it says, that pertinacity (guilt) cannot just be presumed. Every excuse must be made in favor of the suspected person, prior to making a judgment of guilt against such a person. To do so without following this process is to sin gravely against charity.
6. Mr. Daly wrote:
[when it is completely evident that the doctrine denied is a dogma and that it is denied pertinaciously].
There are two considerations:
(1). In order to accuse someone of heresy, it must be a denial of dogma. This means that any denial of anything short of a dogma, while it is a serious sin to deny it, cannot be called a heresy. The person in question remains a member of the Church, although such a person is guilty of censure and mortally sins if he realizes that he is holding an error less than heresy against the Faith.
(2). Even if someone is denying a dogma, as stated before, pertinacity cannot be automatically presumed. Pertinacity must be clearly evident, and all excusing factors, must be reasonably concluded to not apply.
Mr. Daly wrote:
But in every case of doubt - even tenuous doubt - the private individual is not competent to anticipate the judgment of the Church's authorities
Unless moral certainty can be formed against an individual, meaning that there are no excusing factors leading to innocence, then, and only then can we form a judgment of guilt. If there is any reason to excuse someone of guilt, we must do so. If there is a doubt, i.e. guilt is not clear, we must refrain from making any judgment. In any case of doubt, we must suspend our judgment, and wait for the legitimate authorities of the Church to act.
For this crisis, how does this principle apply? If we have no evidence against a person, other than acceptance of the antipope, that alone means that guilt cannot be presumed. If we have evidence against an individual, we must refrain from judgment, unless the evidence is so compelling that all excusing factors have reasonably been removed.
At all times, we must remember our place. The Church gives canonical warnings for a reason. They demonstrate guilt. We must be extremely cautious in making a judgment against individuals that the Church has not judged. This is not to say that we cannot make such judgments, only that extreme caution must be used.
7. Mr. Daly wrote:
[in some cases (though by no means all)]
Here Mr. Daly is affirming that we can make a judgment prior to the Church. This is of course presuming the principles deiscussed above.
Mr. Daly wrote:
[when the heresy and pertinacity are completely clear]
As stated above, both considerations are necessary prior to making a judgment absent the authoritative judgment of the Church. We must be certain that we are dealing with heresy, rather than error less than heresy. We must be certain that the individual we are making a judgment about is pertinacious, i.e. guilty, that all reasonable excusing factors are not lacking.
Mr. Daly wrote:
[ On the other hand one should also be on guard against the common weakness of deeming certain what is in fact doubtful, and of supposing an idea to be a heresy, merely because it appears logically to lead to heresy, which is far from the same thing. Before acting in any case that is not utterly plain and simple, the unqualified person should make himself thoroughly aware of how the saints acted and the extent to which doubtful propositions have been traditionally tolerated until directly condemned, and that good faith has been presumed.]
Here, Mr. Daly gives a warning, that we must not deem certain what is in fact doubtful. We cannot just on flimsy evidence just presume pertinacity. We must try to excuse the person under suspicion. Secondly, we must be certain that we are dealing with real heresy rather than presumed heresy. Many doctrines are such that they carry a note less than heresy.
We must refrain from accusing those of heresy, those who are guilty of a lesser infraction. Such people who are guilty of a lesser infarction are indeed guilty, but are not heretics, therefore remain members of the Church unless they are judged by authority and excommunicated that by name.
Lastly, if the error is uncondemned, we must even be more cautious in making any judgment prior to the judgment of authority.
8. Mr Daly wrote, commenting on this sentence,
This is so even if in good faith he believes that those he is subject to are legitimate pastors, provided it is objectively certain that they are not. [This last sentence is totally and demonstrably the opposite of the truth. Numerous canonists and theologians insist clearly that one is not a schismatic for rejecting a true pope if one has reasonable grounds for believing his election to have been irregular, for instance.]
Here, Mr. Daly reaffirms the truth that it is not schism for rejecting Ben a true Pope if one has reasonable grounds, such as a belief that his election has been irregular.
Mr Daly added the word, "pertinacious, " explaining, "The added word "pertinacious" is absolutely necessary to make this statement accurate, and it completely alters the practical effect."
Mr. Daly is here reaffirming the necessity of pertinacity in determining schism. If pertinacity cannot be certain, absent a judgment from the Church, guilt cannot be presumed.
13. (ii). Mr. Daly wrote:
But it is nonetheless not evident that the contrary opinion of Suarez, Cajetan and John of St Thomas is actually unorthodox. One cannot therefore deem someone to be excluded from the Church for holding that view and attempting to apply it to today's situation, though one can reasonably attempt to convince him that this is not tenable.]
It's worth noting here that one who recognizes that the papal claimant is a pertinacious and public heretic, and continues to regard him as pope until the judgment of the Church is not holding a position contrary to the teaching of the Church. It is a minority opinion, but not a condemned opinion. The position is untenable, as Mr. Daly notes, because it practice it leads to unresolvable contradictions.
14. Mr. Daly wrote:
[The conclusion is "inescapable" and "obligatory" for those who are aware of all the relevant facts and competent to evaluate them. But there is no divine guarantee that all Catholics fit into this category, and every reason to suppose the contrary. In fact very few Catholics are learned enough to refute satisfactorily all of the arguments that have been mounted to defend Wojtyla's claim to the papacy, and it is contrary to charity and common sense to pretend the contrary.]
Mr. Daly does affirm the truth that individuals who do recognize the truth about the heretical antipopes are bound by those truths. While at the same time, we cannot assume that all Catholics are either competent to evaluate these truths, or even if they are competent, that they actually do grasp these truths.
Mr. Daly gives his opinion that "very few Catholics are learned enough to refute satisfactorily all of the arguments that have been mounted to defend Wojtyla's claim to the papacy." I agree with him , the arguments are complex, and even when Catholics grasp this truth, so many times, and I have seen this as a common problem, that they go beyond where the truth and the theology have led them. The original Brussels Syllabus is a perfect example, but this problem is widespread and still very present today.